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INTERNATIONAL CHILD RELOCATIONS FROM U.S.
STATES

Jeffrey A. Parness·
I. lNTRODUCTION
Child caretaking in the United States today frequently is undertaken hy
two or more adults who do not operate under court orders or private
agreements. The adults may, but need not then, be parents under law. 1 There
are usually constraints on one of the adults who desires to relocate with the
child within his/her state or to another American state.2 When an international
relocation with the child is desired, moves from any American state are
governed by The Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction ("Convention").3 Here, inter a Iia, issues arise regarding the chi Id's
"habitual residence," as well as who possesses "rights of custody" and
whether there had been exercises of such custodial rights by the
nonrelocating child's caretakers.4
Though the Convention guides only international child relocations, it
generally defers to the American state custody laws in the states of the
children's ..habitual residences."5 While common sense suggests the
principles guiding international relocations should be comparable to, if not
more difficult than, intrastate or interstate moves, surprisingly this is
sometimes not the case, as illustrated by a 2016 Seventh Circuit ruling on an
international child relocation from Illinois.6
While the issue of "habitual residence" has been deemed "pivotal" in
many international child relocation cases, receiving much attention,7 this
• Professor Emeritus Northern Illinois University College of Law. 13.A., Colby College; J.D., The
University of Chicago.
1 See June Carbone, Th£ Legal Definition ofParenthood: Uncerlainty at the Core of Family Jdenlity,
65 LA. L. REv. 1295, 1297 (2005).
1 See Merle H. Wei11er, Inertia and inequality:
Reconi·eptualizing Dispules over Parrntal
Relocation, 40 u.c. DAVIS L. Ri,;v. 1747, I 753--54 (2007).
i International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (1988); see also Maryl Sattler,

Note, The Problem of Parental Relocation: Closing the l,oophole in the Law of lmernational Child
A bduclion, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 170') (2010).
' Linda Silberman, Hague Convention un lniernalionaf Child Abduction. A Brief Overview and
Case Law Analysis, 28 FAM. L. Q. 9, I 0-11 ( 1994).
s Id. at 11.
' See Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2016).
1 The attention arises, in part, due to the inter-circuit split on how to assess a change in a "habitual
residence." See, e.g, Londono v. Gonzalez., 988 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125 n.1 (D. Mass_ 2013) (describing and
citing to inter-eircui1 difTerenccs).
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article focuses on possessions and exercises of ''custody rights" in
Convention proceedings.ft Unfortunately, here common sense is sometimes
lacking. This article also comments on the challenges posed by issues of
"custody rights" due to expanding U.S. state-law doctrines on de facto (and
comparable) parentage, as well as on nonparent childcare orders over
parental objections.9
The article concludes by urging more sensible approaches to cases
involving international child relocations from the United States. It proposes
that current state statutory provisions and common law rulings on intrastate
and interstate child relocations be consulted, and at least somewhat
employed. Further, it illustrates the challenges posed in child relocation
settings by the emerging de facto parent doctrines, founded on imprecise
nonns typically utilized only after childcare disputes arise, as well as by
nonparent childcare interests, which sometimes override superior parental
rights in order to serve the best interests of children.

II. ONE JNTERNATIONAL CIIILD RELOCATION PROM ILLINOIS

In Martinez v. Cahue in 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit considered a childcare dispute involving two unwed legal parents- a
birth mother and a biological father who had signed a voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity (V AP) at the time of the child's birth. 10 The
child was born in 2006 in Illinois and was raised there until 2013 by his
biological parents, who mainly lived separately but "appear to have
cooperated effectively well" with respect to childcare. 11 The birth mother, a
Mexican citiz.en, was the primary caretaker.12 The father childcared to
February 201 0 through cooperative efforts with the mother; 13 thereafter, until
the Summer of 2013 he operated under "a private written custody agreement"
by which he pledged not to «fight custody in court" and he was "guaranteed
'constant access' and overnight visits '2 nights a week. "' 14 The agreement
was never memorialized in a court order. 15

8
Convention principles and n--sulting cases are reviewed in Silherman, supra note 4. See also Hague
International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, SJ Fed. Reg. 10494-01 (Mar. 26,
1986).
9
See Silhennan, supra note 4, at 33. See generally Carbone, supra note I (discussing the evolution
of parenting as family dynamics have changed).
'° Marti,iez, 826 F.Jd at 987.
11
Id.
12 Id.
I) Jd.
1-1 Id.

IS

Jd.
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In the Summer of 2013 the mother relocated with the child to Mexico,
having received the father's written permission to travel to Mexico "on
vacation." 16 Later, the parents agreed the child would visit the father in
Illinois during "school vacalions." 17 An April 2014 visit went as planned, but
a Summer 2014 vi sit ended with the father not returning the child to
Mexico. 18 The mother flew to Illinois in late August 20 I 4 to "reclaim" her
child, surprised the father, and took her child to her parents' home in
Illinois. 19 That prompted an Illinois state court child custody petition by the
father, who won an "emergency motion" causing the police to seize the child
and return him to his father. 20 The mother tried, but failed, to overcome the
"temporary" Tllinois custody order.21
ln March 2015, the mother filed a petition for custody under the
Convention with the Mexican Central Authority. 22 In December 2015, she
"commenced emergency proceedings" in an Illinois federal court seeking the
child's return to Mexico. 23 Finding there was no "shared parental intent" for
the child's relocation to Mexico, the district court deemed, under the
Convention, that Tllinois "remained" the child's "habitual residence" during
the year the child lived in Mexico.24
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found habitual residence of the child had
been established in Mexico25 and that the father's "retention" of the child was
"wrongful" under the Convention.26 In doing so, it detennined that the
father's lack of intent regarding the child's residence in Mexico had little
"salience" as he "did not obtain a custody order during the time that
mattered,"27 which he needed to do under Illinois law per the Convention in
order to avoid a presumption of sole custody in the birth mother. 28 This
presumption was garnered from an Illinois criminal law indicating that an
unwed birth mother had sole custody, and thus could relocate with the child
and exercise her "exclusive right to establish" the child's "habitual

"' Id. The federal district court determined that the father did nut know the mother intended to

establish residence with the child in Mexico-a finding accepted on appeal. Id.
17

id.

'ij Id. al 987-88. A planned December 2013 visit did not occur. id.

'" Id. at 988.
id.
•11 id. The mother answered the petition and attended a September 17, 2014 hearing. Id.
22 Id.
n Id. She acted after learning the father had obtained a new U.S. passport for the child. Id.
,. Id. This obviated any need to consider whether the child's "h0bitual residence" in lllinois wa~
reestablished between July 2014 and December 2015. Id.
2 ' Id. at 992 This was as of the time father retained the child in 11linois in August 2014. Id.
16
Id. at 993.
7
'
Id. at 990--991
20

2~

Id
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residence," in the absence of a "valid court order" favoring the father. 29 Any
such relocation was subject only to "scrutiny" by an I 11 inois court employing
a child's best interests, which would be prompted by a petition for review of
a pending or completed international relocation. 30 Here, the court observed,
there was no such petition by the father before or after the 2013 relocation to
Mexico. 31 With this observation, the court may have recognized the father's
standing to object to a relocation under an Illinois statute while rejecting such
a recognition under the Convention, which itself defers to state laws on
"custody rights" 32
The Seventh Circuit deemed neither the father's V AP, nor his seven
years of childcare (whether as a primary or secondary caretaker), established
that he had "custody" as required by the Convention in order Lo make the
mother's relocation an abduction from a "habitual residence" in lllinois.33
Such "custody" under the Convention was solely held by the mother in 2013
(and before and after) because the Illinois criminal statute on child abduction
"presumed that, when the parties have never been married to each other, the
mother had legal custody of the child unless a valid court order states
otherwise."34 Here, there was no court order on custody. 35
While the YAP did prompt for the father under Illinois law "all of the
rights and duties of a parent,"36 the Seventh Circuit distinguished a YAP, as
well as any paternity court judgment and any oral or written custodial
agreement, from a court custody order.37 The Seventh Circuit recognized that
the mother's move to Mexico "may have violated the terms of the couple's
private custody agreement," but it "did not violate a right of custody for
Convention purposes."38
The dependence of the father's right of custody, for Convention
purposes, on the existence of a court order was also said by the Seventh
Circuit to be supported by noncriminal Illinois laws. 39 One such statute
presumed a mother's "legal custody" if no court order granted '"custody to
the father," unless the father "has had physical custody for at least six months

29
JO

31

32

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.

ll /d_
34

Id

)s Id
16

7
l
18
39

Id
Id.
/ d.
Id.

(citing 720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/10-S(a)(J) (2017)).

at 991 (citing 720 ILL. COMJ>. STAT. 5/10-S(a)(J) (2017)).

("('l11e falher} never took the proper steps to secure the rights on which he is trying to rely.").

at 989.
al 991-92.
at 990-91 (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(a)(3) (2017)).
at 991.
(citing 750 Ju.. COMP. STAT. 46/305(a) (2017)).
al 991-92.
at 992.
at 990.

2017)
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prior to the date when the mother seeks to enforce her custodial rights."40 The
federal court determined that the father's "constant access" to, and regular
"overnight visits" with, the child for at least three years under a written
agreement did not constitute such statutory "physical custody," as his pact
with the mother "provided him only with agreed visitation rights."41
A second lllinois statute simply declared that for two legal parents, "joint
custody does not arise automatically. " 42 Rather, joint custody requires a court
order upon a finding of "the best interests of the child."43 Again the court
determined a custody order for Convention purposes means joint custody,
not a visitation, order. 44 Terminology again mattered, in a setting,
incidentally, where the terms---custody and visitation-have been jettisoned
from Illinois statutes and replaced by the phrases "parenting responsibilities"
and "parenting time." 45
The Seventh Circuit ru Iing on "custody tights," for Convention purposes,
is 1imited to court custody orders, and thus is not inclusive of court visitation
(or other) significant childcare orders benefitting nonrelocating parents.46
This ruling undermines major goals of the Convention. As one court noted,
in international child relocations, judges must be guided by the Convention's
purposes and "not simply look" to the relevant legal provisions in the
preremoval country of habitual residence. 47 A key purpose is to have the
preremoval country of habitual residence "decide upon questions of custody
and access," with a "strong presumption" favoring that residence.48 As to the
requisite that the nornelocating parent have a right of custody which is being
exercised, such a right "is lo be broadly interpreted so as to bring as many
cases as possible under the purview of the Convention."49

a

'°

Id. at 991 (citing 750 11.L. COMP. STAT. 45/l 2(a)(2) (2014) (repealed 2016)).
Id. lt proceeded to note that even had the agreement "spoken to custody," the result would be the
same as "Illinois courl~ generally do not respect private agreements affecting custody." Id. (citing In re
4'

Maniage of Linta, 18 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ill. /\pp. Ct. 2014) (slating lhat no custody pacts are allowed in
premarital agreements)).
' 2 Id. (citing 750 IL.L.COMr. STAT. 5/602.l(b) (2014)).
4i Jd. (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6021 (c) (2014)).
44 Id. (noting Illinois did not accord the father the "lesser right" to "detenninc a child's country
residence").

" 750 ILL. COMP, STAT. 5/600, 602. 7-8 (20\ 7).
.,, See Murlinez, 826 F.3d 983.

or

Moura v. Cunha, 67 F. Supp. 3d 493, 498-99 (D. Mass. 2014) (citing Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d
450, 455-56 (1st Cir. 2000)).
•~ Id at 499 (citing Danaipour v. Mc Larey, 286 F.3d I, 13 ( I st Cir. 2002)).
9
'
Loftis v. Loltis, 67 F. Supp. 3d 798, 809 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Abbutl v. Abbott, 560 U.S. I, 19
(20 I0)). Outside the Convention, intrasta1e and interstate relocaJions within the Un iled States have also
prompted calls for broad recognition of the inlen:sts of all nonrelocating child caretakers. See, e.g.,
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Proposed Model Relocalion Act: An Act Relating to the
Relocation of the Principal Residence of a Child, IO J. AM. ACII D. MA TRIM. LAW. I, 3 (I 998). Section
' 7
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A court custody order has not been deemed necessary to establish
"custody rights" under the Convention. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that a nonrelocating parent's ne exeat right to consent before an
international removal was a "right of custody" under the Convention, where
the nonrelocating parent then only had court-ordered visitation, which was
being exercised. 50 It did recognize that this "right of custody" must be
distinguished under the Convention from "rights of access," which do not
prompt the remedy of return to the habitual residence, per court order,
available to a nonrelocating parent with "rights of custody."51 "Rights of
custody" "include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in
particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence," while "rights
of access" "include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a
place other than the child's habitual residence." 52
Concerns with the Seventh Circuit ruling go beyond disserving the
Convention's goals involving respect for children's initial "habitual
residences." The ruling has horrifying implications beyond unwed Illinois
fathers, who, in some instances, may have been the primary or exclusive
caretakers, where their opportunity for Illinois court "scrutiny" is limited to
a postrelocation judicial inquiry into their children's current best interests,
assuming they know which process to employ. Consider unwed lesbian
partners, whose eggs prompted births, whose childcare interests were
recognized in valid, written agreements, and who childcared with the birth
mothers, but who never obtained court orders before (their) children were
relocated (not abducted) overseas by their birth mothers.53 And consider
unwed gestational surrogates who, before or after birth, relocate
internationally without notice to the intended parents who failed to secure a

IO I(3) defines "person" en1itled lo childcare to include a rer,on "entitled by virtue of a court order or by
an express agreement that is subject to court enforcement". id But see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW Of FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.1 7(1) (2002) (speaking only lo the effects of one
parent's relocation on another parent's ability to exercise childcare responsibilities).
50
Abbo/1, 560 U.S. at 6, 22.
s, Id. at 9. Exceptions to the return remedy for a nonrelocating parent with custody rights include a
"grave rise" of ham, to the child upon rcrum or the child's objection, assuming the child has reached a
sufficient age and maturity level so that it is appropriate to 'i:ake accow,t" of the child's views. Id. at 22
(citing Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. I 049401, Art 13(b) (Mar 26, 1986)).
" Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241, 2%, 250 (Mass. 1993) (noting that when access rights are made
more di!fo.:ult for nonrclocating parents, relocating custodial parents may be ordered to pay expenses
related to lhc exercises of those access righL,) (quoting The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at An. S(aHb)).
s.1 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/701 (stating that assisted reproduction births arc outside lhe
Gestational Surrogacy Ad).

20171
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(child or fetal) custody order. 54 Finally, cons ider stepparents whose
premarital or midmarital agreements assuring them, subject to later court
oversight, of continuing parental-like, if not parental, interests in their
stepchildren upon marriage dissolution are avoided by international
relocations.55 In a ll these settings, there is often little incentive for a nonbirth
mother with childcare interests to secure a child custody order other than the
fear of an international relocation, especially where there are recognized
constraints on birth mothers to re locate w ith their children intrastate or
interstate.
In fact, it is harder today under Martinez for one legaJ parent to relocate
from a hab itual residence in Illinois to another habitual res idence in lllinois,
or to a habitual residence in another American state, over the objection of
another legal parent than it is for an unwed birth mother to relocate outside
the country.56 Both under the former and the current lllinois laws, intrastate
and interstate relocations at the behest of a primary parental caretaker are
harder than international relocations where a secondary parental caretaker
has no child custody order.
As noted, in the international setting the nonrelocation childcare parent
without a court custody order can only seek judicial scrutiny of any relocation
under a child 's current best interests test. 57 By contrast, in the interstate
setting today in Illinois, one childcare parent has a right to a hearing before
an interstate child relocation by the other parent. 58 A hopeful relocating
married parent must seek judicial permission to relocate, whether or not the
nonrelocating parent has a court order on childcare, as long as the
nonrelocating parent has childcare recognized in "a written a 6>rcement that
a llocates s ignificant dec ision-making responsibilities, parenting time, or
both."59 Comparable limits operate for unwed parents.6 t1 In determining
whether to want permission to relocate interstate, the best interests analysis
e ncompasses several statutory factors, including some which focus more on

$a See, e.g., id. act 47/1; D.C. CODE 16-40K(a) (2017) (stating that a petition for parentage in
surrogacy setting "may be filed by the intended pa.rent or parents or the surrogate").
1
' Since July 2012, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni form State l.aws has
recognized, in its Uniform Premariuil and Marital Agreements Act, the relevance of agTecmcnts on
"custodial responsibility" when judges determine childcare is~ucs upon mar-ii.al dissolutions. Jeffrey A.
Parness, Parentage Pren-ups and Midnups, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 343, 348 (2015).
j6 See Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2016).
SJ Id. at 991 (citing 750 ILL. COMJ>. STAT. 45/13.S {2016) (repeHled 2016)).
I& 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609.2(f) (2016).
59
Id. act 5/600(f). The agreement is a "parenting plan". Id.
00
See, e.g,, id. act 46/808. Under the Parentage Act of 2015, a court considering a "relocation
judgment modification" must be guided by the factors specified in the Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act. id.

44
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the intentions of, and the effects upon, lhe parents and the child's extended
family members than on the intentions of~ and effects upon, the child.61
In the intrastate setting today in Illinois, a nonrclocating childcare parent
has a comparable hearing right, with the same petition requirement for the
wishful relocating parent, as long as the desired new residence is far enough
away from the child's "current primary rcsidencc."62
The non international relocations standards in Illinois at the relevant ti mes
in the Seventh Circuit case differed a bit, but were still more protective of the
nonrelocating parent.63 Thus, before January 1, 2016, there was no single
statutory approach to intrastate and interstate child relocations. For intrastate
child relocations, the "general rule" was that a "custodial parent" may move
anywhere in Illinois "withoutjudiciaJ approval."64 Yet it was recognized that
in determining custody, a court could "condition custody upon the custodian
living within a reasonable distance from the non-custodial parent to facilitate
visitation.,>6s
For interstate relocations, an Illinois court was authorized to grant leave
"to any party having custody of any minor child or children to remove such
child or children from Illinois whenever such approval is in the best interests
of such child or children," with the "burden . . . on the party seeking
removal."66 Unlike current laws, this authorization was not accompanied by
specific statutory factors that were .to be uti Iized in best interests analyses.67
The Seventh Circuit did not explain why these Illinois norms, in effect in
2013 when the mother relocated with her child to Mexico, would not apply
as well to international relocations, as the Convention does defer to the laws
of the state of the child's habitual residence, which was Illinois in 2013.68

61

Id. act 5/609.2(g) (listing reasons why a parent wishes to relocate or objects to relocation, including
the presence of extended family members at existing and proposed new Jo.;alion).
2
" See id. act 5/600(g) (addressing both some intrastate and interstate relocations). The factors
considered by a court when a nonrelocaling parent objects revolve around a child's best intereslS. Id. act
6/609.2(g).
6
l See id acl 5/609.2(g); Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 992-93 (71h Cir. 2016).
64
See, e.g., In re Marriage ofSilI!lardzija, 850 N.E.2d 880, 887 (111. App. Ct. 2006) ("In general, a
parent with primary physical custody of lhc children need not obtain judicial approv3J before moving to
another local.ion within lll inois ... ").
M Id. Of course, such a condition could not unduly burden a custodian's constitutional rights, as with
the right to travel. See, e.g., Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional
Perspective, 34 U. l.,ou1sV1LLE J. FAM. L. 1, 94 (1996); David V. Chipman & Mandy M. Rush, The
Necessity of"Righi to Travel" Analysis in Cw·/odial Parent Re/ocarion Ca.fes, IO WYO. L. REV. 267, 280
(2010).
c,; See. e.g., In re Marriage of Collingboume, 791 N.E.2d 532, 544 (Ill. 2003) (applying fonner 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. S/609(a) (2010 (repealed 2016)).
61
Id. at 546---552 (reviewing and applying common law factors on best intcrcsls).
"" See Martinez, 826 F.3d at 990--93.

20 l 7]
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In addition, the Seventh Circuit ruling, as long as it stands,6 ~ can prompt
violations of the federal constitutional childcare interests of prospective and
actual legal parents. In Lehr v. Robertson, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
that a biological father of a child born of sex to an unwed mother had both a
parental opportunity interest in establishing a "custodial, personal or financial
relationship" with his child once born, as well as a parental childcare interest
in a child with whom he had established such a relationship. 70 Lehr is not yet
widely applied to childcare opportunity interests arising from intended
parental childcare contracts involving, e.g., lesbian partners with assisted
72
reproduction pacts71 or stepparents with premarital or midmarriage pacts.
Lehr, as well, is not yet widely applied to lesbian partners or stepparents who,
with such pacts, have already established "custodial, personal or financial"
relationships that are parental-like in nature. 73 But, its rationales are
applicable.74

111. INTERNATIONAL CHILD RELOCATIONS FROM OTHER STATES
Of course, international child relocations from "habitual residences" in
states outside of Illinois are also guided by the Convention. 75 Sometimes, at
least, issues can arise regarding not only whether custody was exercised by
the nonrelocating child caretaker, as it did in the Seventh Circuit case, but
also whether the nonrelocating child caretaker who was exercising custody
possessed "rights of custody ... under the law of the state in which the child

69 While an Illinois state court did not review the circumstanct:s in Martinez (as ii might have if a
fedcrdl court had abstained or certified um:ertain state law questions), the Seventh Circuit's lake on Illinois
"custody rights," albeit for Convention purposes, is not binding in later 111inois state court proceedings.
See, e g., Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 991 N.E.2d 745, ?65 (II!. 201J) ("11linois courts, not
federal courts, arc arl>iters of state law.").
10 Lehr v. Robert~on, 463 U.S. 248,262 (1983).
71 Recognitions that such pacts prompt interests under Lehr are particular! y appropriate for nonbirth
mothers who are biologically tied, via donate-0 gametes, to children horn to their partners.
12 Here, again, recognitions that such pacts prompt interests under Lehr are particularly appropriate
for certain stepparents (typically stepfathers) who are biologically tied to chil<lren earlier born to their
Cllrrent spouses, as where ch ilclren were once, hut no longer are, subject to a marital paternity presumption
(e.g., wife had extramarital sexual relations leading to a marriage dissolution; the disestablishment of her
former husband as the legal father; and a later marriage between the birth mother and biological father).
11
· Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262
14 When U.S. Supreme Court certiorari review of the Seventh Circuit ruling was sought, lhc petition
did tocu, on Lehr. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-10, Cahue v. Martinez, 826 F.3d 983 (2016)
(No. 16-582), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1329 (2017) (arguing that under Lehr, petitioner had an "interest in
personal contact with the child which receives substantial protection under the Due Prncess Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment," and urging lhe child's constitutionally protected libt:rty interest in the "care and
society" of her father and "an unconstitutional gender-based classificatiori").
" S ii berm an, supra note 4, al l 4--15.

46
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was habitually resident immediately before the removal."76 Thorny questions
arise with the latter where there are intended parent doctrines.77
A review of precedents on " custody" exercises under the Convention
follows. It demonstrates that explicit court orders are typically not needed by
nonrclocating child caretakers who wish to challenge possible or actual
international child relocations.
Next, there is a review of who possesses "rights of custody" under the
Convention. It demonstrates the challenges facing nonrelocating child
caretakers who are neither biological nor adoptive parents with established
"custodial, personal or financial" relationships with the affected children.78
Such caretakers might possess "rights of custody" under the ever-increasing
recognitions, at least in the United States, of intended parent doctrines which
arise under varying names, including de facto parent, presumed parent, and
equitable adoption parent. 79
Finally, there is a briefreview of American state child relocation statutes.
It demonstrates that often the limits on parental moves with children can be
applied to international as well as interstate relocations, though the factors in
assessing these two types of moves may need to vary a bit, as do interstate
and intrastate moves.Ro

A. Exercises ofRights ofCustody
As noted by the Seventh Circuit, an international child relocation " is
wrongful under the Convention" where it is a " breach of rights of custody
... under the law of the state in which the child was habitually resident
immediately before" the relocation, when at the time of relocation, "those
rights were exercised . . . or would have been so exercised but for' the
relocation.81 Though noting "the pivotal question ... is generally that of

Id. at IL
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, ParenJage law (R)cvolution: The Key QuestiollS, 59 WAYNE LR.Ev.
743, 752• 763 (2013). In Illinois, intended parent childcare doclrine.~ operate in assisted non-surrogacy and
surrogacy reproduction settings, but not in J)OSt-birth settings where children are born of sex. See, e.g.,
750 ILL. COMI'. STAT. 47/1-175 (Gestational Surrogacy Act); 750 11,1.. COMP. STAT. 46/70)-/710
(suggesting that a~sisted reproduction births are outside the Gestalional Surrogacy Act); In re Scarlett Z.D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 781, 792-95 (Ill 2015) {stating that "equitable adoption,'' a common law doctrine,
"does not apply to proceedings for parentage, custody, and visilalio n"; such proceedings are dependent on
legislation, which necessarily arises as a re.~ult of a "policy debate" in which all may be heard).
11
See infra Part lll{B).
" See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Formnl Decfamtions ofIntended C/11/dcare Parentage , 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 87 (2017), http://ndlawrevicw.org/20 17/03/fonnnl-dcclarations--of-intendcdchildcarc-parcntage.' (analyzing the developments and challenges of intended pan;nt doctrines}.
1111
See infra Part lll(C).
81
Martinez v. Cahue, 826 fl.3d 983 (7th Cir 2016) (citing Hague International Child Abduction
1

•
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habitual residcncc,"82 the Seventh Circuit resolved the case on the question
of whether the non relocating child caretaker, clearly a parent, was exercising
"rights of custody," ruling there was no such exercise as there was no court
order supporting the childcare. 83 This resolution is problematic on policy
grounds, as noted. Fortunately, the need for a court order to demonstrate
exercises of parental custody rights has not been found necessary under the
laws of other states of "llabitual residence," in and outside of lhe United
States.84 Thus the Seventh Circuit ruling can be easily overcome by a new or
a corrected understanding of Illinois laws on what constitutes exercises of
"rights of custody" by parents.
Differing standards on exercises of custodial rights, including mandates
on prior court orders, may arise where such custodial rights, for Convention
purposes, are exercised by both parents and nonparents. Parental childcare
rights arc protected under federal constitutional due process precedents,85
while non-parental childcare rights, as for child caretaking grandparents,
aunts, or stepparents, are today chiefly creatures of only state statutes, and
perhaps some common law precedents. 86 Where nonparent childcare interests
are recognized, they usually involve, as they must given superior parental
childcare interests, less childcare opportunities than arc afforded to

Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. I0494-0 I, Art. J (Mar_ 26, 1986)).

,, Id.

"' Id. at 994 (stating that tht: relocating parent "had sole custody ... under ill inois law") .
.,, A U.S. state law case is Gutierrez v. Fox, 394 P.3d 1096, 1106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that
a hopefi.JI relocating birth mother, from Aritona to Wisconsin, nei:ded the unwed biological father's
consent to the relocation, or a court order authorizing the relocation, where father, who wa~ "without a
specific court order designating parental decision-making," had signed a voluntary paternity
acknowledgement and been listed on the child's birth ccrtificale). Non-U.S. cases include Sabogal v.
Vi:larde, 106 F.3d 689, 700 (D. Md. 2015) (finding parental custody authority for each biological parent
under Peruvian law on patria polestas, a Roman law concept); Patrick v. Rivera-Lopez, 708 F.3d 15, 19
(I st Cir. 2013) (finding "parental responsibility," under laws of England and Wales, where unwed
biological lather married birth mother in Puerto Rico after birth); Hofman v. Sender, 716 F.3d 282, 291
(2d Cir. 2013) (finding married hiological faJJ1er had "custody rights" under laws of Quebec as he was
involved in "family decisions" on where he, birth mother, and their children might move); Neumann v.
Neumann, 187 F. Supp. 3d 848, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (stating both Mexico and Gennany broadly confer
joint custody rights to married biological parents "unless / imited by judicial decree"); In re Stead v.
Menduno, 77 F. Supp. 3d I 029, I034 (D. Colo. 2014) (finding unwed biological fatherhatl custody rights,
under New Zealand law, a~ he lived with birth mother during pregnancy and was listed on birth certificate).
~) See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Constitutional Con.vtraints on Second Parent lows, 40 OHIO N. U. L.
Ri:;v. 811, 837--42 (20l 4) (reviewing how federal conslitutional childcare interests constrain emerging de
facto parent laws).
"'' See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, 1hird Party Stepparenl Childcare, 67 MERCER L. REV. 383, 387-93
(2016) (reviewing both general and special ~tepparent childcare laws); Jcffi-ey A. Pamt:~s & Alex Yorko,
Nonparenlal Childcare and Child Contacl Orders for Grandparents, 120 W VA. L. R.Ev. (reviewing
current U ,S. stale grandparent childcare laws).
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recognized parents_is7 Thus, nonparents may only be eligible for visitation, as
distinct fro m custody.88 Yet such visitation as well as custody (or parental
responsibility) interests under state laws may be interpreted to constitute
exerc ises of''custody rights" for Convention purposes.89

B. Possessing Rights ofCustody
As noted by the Seventh C ircui~ an international child relocation " is
wrongful under the Convention" where it is a "breach of rights of custody
... under the law of the state in which the child was habitually resident
immediately before" the relocation when at the time of relocation, "those
rights were exercised . .. or would have been so exercised but for" the
relocation. 90 Though noting "the pivotal question .. . is generally that of
habitual residence,"91 the Seventh Circuit resolved the case on the question
of whether the nonreJocating child caretaker was exercising "rights of
custody," deeming there was no such exercise as there was no court order
supporting the childcare.92
With this absence of exercised custodial rights, there was no relevance in
the question of whether the nonrelocating chiJd caretaker, the acknowledged
bio logical father of the child assumedly born of consensual sex, possessed
"rights of custody" to be exercised.93 In other cases, the issue of who
possesses «custody rights" can be very germane, as where a nonrelocating
child caretaker has, in fact, been exercising custodial rights in a state of the
child's "habitual residence," but where a legal parent, hoping to relocate
internationally, asserts he/she has sole custody of the child under the law of
the state of " habitual residence."94 Here, terminology can be confusing as
even a parent with "sole" custody under a court order nevertheless may not
have unilateral decision-making authority regarding an international
relocation.95

Trnxel v. Granvi lle, 530 U-S. 57, 65, 75 (2000) (recognizing that federal constitutional parcntaJ
"liberty interesLf' limit American slate laws allowing nonparent child visitation orders over parental
objections).
68
Id. at 72.
8
' See, e.g. , Martinez v. Cah1.1c, 826 F.3d 983, 993 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that any type of contact
with the child that is regular "qualifies as 'exercising ... custody rights' under I.he Convention") (quoting
Walker v. Walker, 701 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2012)).
"° Id. at 989 (citing Hague lnlcmational Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 5 1
fed . Reg. 10494-01 , Art_ 3 (Mar. 26, 1986)).
"' id.
.,.,, Id. at 994 (stating that the relocating parent ~had sole custody ... under Illinois law").
9 i Id. al 991.
•• Id. at 990-93.
1
~ See, e.g., Garcia v. Angarita, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (staling that the father
37
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Questions involving possessions of custody rights by those who have
undertaken earlier significant childcarctaking can arise both for would-be
child relocators and for child caretakers opposed to proposed child
relocations initiated by others. Of course, not all wl-io significantly engage in
childcare may possess "rights of custody" under the Convention. But until
recently, distinctions were easier to draw under American state laws between
those who did or did not possess "custody rights." Traditionally, childcare
rights in relocation disputes were limited to actual biological parents,
presumed biological parents (i.e., husbands of birth mothers), and adoptive
parents, assuming that childcare interests had not been earlier fonnally
tenninated by the government or abandoned. Distinctions today are more
difficult to draw as, increasingly, intended parentage doctrines recognize
childcare interests in newly-designated parents who are without biological or
adoptive ties. 96 These doctrines (herein "de facto parentage") depend on
childcare intentions and/or parental-like acts occurring at no particular point
in time. 97
In the international child relocation setting involving removals from the
United States to a foreign country, the de facto parentage doctrines of
individual U.S. states can determine who possesses "custody rights" for
Convention purposes as relocating or nonrelocating caretakers. These
doctrines typically establish parity as between established de facto parents
and established biological or adoptive parents.98 Unlike biological or
adoptive ties which are typically recognized under law as establishing
parentage long before any relocation issues arise, de facto parentage often
requires judicial establishment at the time relocation issues arise. 99

retained the right undeT Colombi!lll law to bar- his ch.ild's move abroad, though lhe mother had a "sole
custody" order); Fumes v. Reeves, 362 r .3d 702, 7 ! 5 ( 11th Cir. 2004) o\!ermled in part by Lozano v.
Montoy11 Alvares, 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2013) (finding that the parent had custody right regarding moving
abroad from Norway, though other par-enl could unilaterally decide where in Norway child would live).
96 See. e.g, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-2()1 (2013) (re.:ogni7.ing de facto parentage and parentage
re~ulling from reproductive assistance).
1
' See. e.g., Guardianship ofK.N., 13 N.E,3d 271,275 (Mass. 2017) (defining de facto parenting as
participating in the child's life, living with the child, and performing significant caretaking functions with
the legal guardian's consent).
9
~ See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931-932 (Del.2011) (de facto parents arc on equal footing
with biological and adoptive parents); ME. STAT. tiL 19-A, § 1891(4) (2016) (stating that the de facto
parentage adjudication "establishes parentage").
?9 Biological parents of children whose parental rights were not earlieT established, as by signing
YAJ>s around the time of birth, on occasion can later become de facto parenl~, as by residing with and
rearing children while holding them out as their own. Such parent~ oould include men whose corisensual
sex with birth mothers lt::d to births i:llld women who contributed ova leading to chi Id births. for other women
through assisted reproduction.
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De facto parentage doctrines often require judicial inquiries long after
birth that are guided by criteria occurring at no precise points in time. 100
Thus, while some state laws mandate a two-year period of residency by a
nonparent with a child in order for the nonparent to qualify as a possible de
facto parent, these laws also usually also require, e.g., that an alleged de facto
parent ho ld the child out as one's own; develop a parental-like relationship
with the child; and/or provide ecooomic support to the child. 101 Elsewhere,
only some indefinite period of residency with a child is required. rn2 De facto
parentage can be sought not only to secure what the Convention recognizes
as "custody rights," but also to make possible judicially-mandated child
support_ 103
In the international child relocation setting involving removals from the
United St.ates to a foreign country, there is also some possibility that
nonparent childcare doctrines of indivi<lua1 U.S. states can determine who
possesses "custody rights" under the Convention as relocating, or especially
as nonrelocating, caretakers. These doctrines al low certain nonparents to
secure judicial childcare orders over parental objections, if there are parents.
As with de facto parentage, "custody rights" arising under such nonparent
childcare doctrines for Convention purposes could be first employed at the
time international relocation issues arise.
One exemplary international child relocation case recognized there were
rights of custody under the Convention in Irish maternal grandparents who
were testamentary child guardians under Irish law pursuant to the deceased
birth mother's will. 10,t Given these rights, a U.S. federal appeals court ordered
the father, the deceased birth mother's husband when her 3 children were
born, to return the children from Florida to Ireland. where they all had been
living before a 2005 removal, at least "until the guardianship of the children

,no For a general review of imprecise American state: de facto parentage laws, see Jeffrey /\. Parness,
Choosing A171Qng Imprecise American State Parentage Laws, 76 LA. L. RF.v, 481, 492- 94 (2015).
101
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN.,§ 40-l 1A-204(A)(5)(Wcst 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. 14-20-10(1)
(e) (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7700-20o1(A)(5) (West 2017); Wvo . STAT. J\NN. l4-2504(a)(v) (West 2017). But .ree D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.01(1)(13) (West 2017) (stating that a de facto
parent is one who "live[s} ... in the same household for a1 least IO of the 12 months immediately'' before
CLL~tody proceedings are hegun).
102
See, e.g. , MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1)(d} (West 2017) (stating that it is when "the person
receives the child into the person's home"); D.C. CODE J\NN. 16-831 .Ol(l)(A) (West 2017) (staling thnt
a de facto parent is one who "lived with the child in the same household at lhe time of the child's birth or
adoption by the child's parent").
wi See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-20l(c), 8-204(a)(5), 8-203, 50 I (a) (West 2017) (stating that
the duty to support a child under 18 rests with parents, who include de facto and presumed parents- two
forms ofnonbiological, nonadoptive parents); ME REv. STAT. ANN. 19-A § 1891 (a), 1853 (2017) (stating
that du: de facto purcnt is a parent for all purposes unless specifically cxemp1ed).
,.., Hartley v. Roy, 485 F.3d 641 (1Ith C ir. 2007).
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is properly determined by appropriate Irish court." 105 The testamentary
guardianships arose from the will of the birth mother who died in 2000 in
Ireland, where the wilt was probated in 2003. 1cx; Under Irish law, the
guardians need not even have had physical custody of the children for them
to have "custody rights" for Convention purposes. 107
Non parent childcare doctrines, like de facto parentage doctrines,
typically employ at least some criteria that occur at no precise points in time.
Certain American state nonparcnt childcare statules are more general,
recognizing interests in any "person" who has acted in imprecise ways. 108
Other statutes are particular to certain people, like grandparents 109 or
stepparents. 110 Yet in both de facto parent and nonparent childcare settings,
any childcare interests prompting "custody rights" might be first asserted
when international child relocations are sought.
Whether recognized or alleged de facto parents or nonparents with
childcare interests have state-recognized "custody rights" for Convention
purposes often should be detennincd by whether the same or comparable
childcare interests would be recognized in intrastate or interstate child
relocation settings. Unfortunately, to date there is little explicit recognition
in intrastate and interstate relocation cases of the interests of either de facto

10
'

Hanley, 485 F.3d at 643-44, 650.
Jd. ill 644.
'°7 Id. al 646 (quoting GEOFFRIW SHANNON, Ci!ILD LAW 46 (2005)). Professor Silbennan describes
two Convention cases where lhird parties (Hungarian Guardianship Authority and the Aleut Indian trihe)
might have had custody rights for Convention purposes. Silberman, .mpra note 4, at 18--19.
II>$ See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED I .AWS 25-5-29 (20 I7) (stating "any pt:r.;on olher than the parent of a child'' can
seek custody ofor visilalion with "any child with whom he or she has seived a.~ a primary caretaker, ha-. closely
bonded as a parental figure, <lr has otherwise formed a significant and substantial relationship'1; Co.LO. REV.
STAT. 14-10-123( IXe) (2017) (stating that there is nonparcnt childcare slanding when excrcisc of"physical care
of a child for a period of one hundred eighty-two days or more"); Wis. STAT. § 767."13(1) (West 2017) (stating
there may be visitation for "a person who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with
!he child"). This is the approach suggested in Nat'I. Conference ofCornm'rs. on Unif. State Laws, Non-Parental
Child Custody and Visilalion Act, AM. B. Ass 'N. (Apr. 7, 2017), httpsf/www .americanbar.org.tcontcnt/dam/aba/
administrative/family_law/couneil/20 I6- l 7/l 7spring_tab%2005 .authchcckdam.pd17 This is a draJt for the May
1-7, 2017 Style Commillee Meeting. Id
Ill'! See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 25.20.065 (2016) (stating grandparent may get visitation when they have
had "ongoing personal contact" with grandchild); GA. CODE ANN.§ 19-7-J(c)( I) (West 2017) (stating !hat
grandparent may get visitation if otherwise harm to "health or welfare" of grandchild); N.D. CENT. Corn;
ANN. 14--09-05.1(1} (West 2017) (stating that grandparents of nonmarital child can gain "reasonable
visilation right" where child's best interests served and no interference with "parent-child relationship").
110 See, e.g., TENN. Como ANN. § 36-6-303 (2017) (stating that a stepparent is eligible for "n:a~onahle
visitation rights" when "aclually providing or contributing towards the support of lhe child"); OR. REV.
S 1'AT. I 09_ 119(3) (West 2017) (stating that there may be stepparent custody or visitation where "childparcnl relationship exists," or lherc is an "ongoing personal relationship"); UTAH COD£ ANN. § 30-5a-103
(West 2017) (stating that there may be eligibility for custody when stepparent, inter alia, contributed 10
"child's wellbeing").
I D6
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parent or nonparent child caretaki;:rs. Clearly, where de facto parents are
generally on par with biological and adoptive parents in childcare settings,
their voices in international child relocation disputes should be heard.
By contrast, nonparent child caretakers are not generally on par with
parental caretakers. Yet, state laws could still recognize that they possess
"custody rights" applicable in Convention cases, as lhe Convention defers to
lhe laws of «habitual residences" without limiting "custody rights" to those
deemed parents. 111 Of course, in the United States, any such rights must
respect the superior parent.al childcare interests protected under the U.S. and
relevant state constitutions. Yet, for example, there may be no such parental
interests, as when there is no living childcare parent and a newly-appointed
child guardian seeks to relocate with the child outside of the United States.
C. Application ofAmerican State Relocation Statutes to

International Relocations

As in Illinois, other state relocation statutes~n their face--apply to at
least some international relocations. While these statutes should be employed
in determinations of who possesses "custody rights" under the Convention,
as it defers to "the law ofthe State in which the child was habitually resident,"
they may not be wholly applicable to issues of whether those in possession
were "actually" exercising these rights, as there is no similar Convention
deference here.112 In fact, custody exercise issues in Convention settings
somet imes are judicially detennined under Convention case precedents
involving custody exercises in differfog states. 113
While helpful in international relocation cases, many American state
relocation statutes should not be dispositive because they are limited in scope.
Thus, while there is precedent recognizing nonparents can possess "custody
rights" for Convention purposes, 114 U.S. state child relocation statutes
sometimes speak only of parental relocations. I15 Further, these statutes

111
See Hague lntcmationaJ Child Abduction Convention; Tex! and Legal Analysis, 51 l'cd. Reg.
10494-0 1, Art. 3 (Mar. 26, 1986).
112 Id.
113
See, e.g., Walker v. Walker, 701 F.3d I JI 0, 1121-23 (7th Cir. 2012) (using precedent regarding
children of habitual residence in Israel. in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001), to decide
whether a father was exercising custody rights over his children, whose habitual residence was in
Australia). See also Sabogal v Velarde, 106 F. Supp. 3d 689, 702 (D. Md. 20\5) (using precedent
involving habitual residence in Australia, in Walker, and Germany, in Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.Jd I 060,
I 065 (6th Cir. 1996), to determine whether falher was exercising custody rights over his children, whose
habitual residence was in Peru).
114
Hanley v. Roy, 485 F.3d 641, 6% (1 ltll Cir. 2007).
1
" See, e.g. , AruZ. Rev. STAT. J\NN. § 25-408(A) (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 23-2225(a) (2017);
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sometimes apply only to residence changes "to another state," without
explicit reference to moves to another country (or to a new home within the
current state of residence). 116 Finally, such statutes sometimes speak only to
child relocations when there is "a permanent parenting plan or final order."117
Yet an unwed parent with no court order may seek to relocate, as in Martinez,
as may a wed parent who is separated but has no ongoing marriage
dissolution proceeding. 118

IV. CONCLUSION
The Convention places limits, for good reason, on international child
relocations from the United States. 119 These limits recognize the need to take
account of the "custody rights" of nonrelocating child caretakers. 120 Beyond
the Convention, a similar need is usually recognized in intrastate and
interstate child relocations. As the Convention defers to the laws on child
"custody rights," if not their exercises, in the states ofthe children's "habitual
residences," international child relocations should often be guided in
comparable ways to intrastate and interstate child relocations on issues of
who has "custody rights." 121
At least in the United States, there are issues in state child relocation
cases arising from the emergence of de facto (and similar) childcare
parentage doctrines. Here, "custody rights" go beyond biological and
adoptive parents. These doctrines often require judicial detenninations at the
time of relocations, where they are guided by norms dependent upon
imprecise acts occurring at no precise points in time, quite unlike parentage
and custody rights founded on biology_, marriage, and adoption.
Comparably, there are sometimes issues in Convention cases due to
earlier childcare by nonparents. American state laws on nonparent childcare
should sometimes prompt "custody rights" for Convention purposes, as
where there are currently no biological or adoptive parents with "custody
rights" and where nonparents have acted in parental-like ways for children
sought to be relocated internationally by others. 122

MONT. Coot ANN.§ 40-4-217(1) (West 2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 461-A: 12(11) (2017).
116
See, e.g., N .JJ. CENT. CODE ANN.§ 14-09-07(1)-{2) (2017).
111
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108(a) (West 2017).
"" See Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983 (7til Cir.2016).
119
Hague lnlemational Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 1049401 (Mar. 26, 1986).
120
121

See id.

See id.
m See id.

